I. Introduction
The Security Council of the United Nations expresses itself through two principal channels: resolutions and "presidential statements". 1 A presidential statement is a statement of the Security Council and not, as the term might suggest, of its President. When making a statement on behalf of the Security Council the President, under the authority of the Council, represents it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations. 2 Presidential statements are nowadays, as a rule, read out by the President on behalf of the Council in a formal meeting of the Council after the text of the statement has been agreed by all the members of the Council in informal consultations of the whole. Presidential statements, expressing the consensus of the Security Council as an * Of the Board of Editors; University Lecturer, Oxford University, and Tutorial Fellow in Law, St Anne's College, Oxford. Email: stefan.talmon@law.ox.ac.uk. This article was completed in October, 2003. organ of the United Nations have also been termed consensus statements. The term "presidential statement" can be found neither in the Charter of the United Nations nor in the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council. 3 Although not a new phenomenon-the first such statement was made by the President as early as 1946 4 -it is only since the beginning of the 1990s that the Security Council has heavily relied on the practice of having its President make statements on its behalf. While from 1946 to 1990 there were just 148 or less than four such statements per annum, since then 653 statements or an average of 50 per year have been issued, making a total of 801 presidential statements to date as compared to 1513 resolutions in the same period (see Annex 1). During some years, 5 the Council adopted even more presidential statements than resolutions. While the increase in presidential statements was, of course, at least in part due to the rapid growth in Council activity in general after the momentous changes of 1989, it also shows that the Council has discovered a new instrument of expressing its views and sending messages to the parties of a conflict or the international community.
The growing significance of presidential statements has found expression in the fact that in 1993 a new appendix was included in the annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly providing a chronological listing of all the presidential statements for the period under review indicating the date when a statement was made or issued and the relevant agenda item or subject matter. 6 In addition, since 1 January 1994 presidential statements have been published like resolutions in their own annual series using the prefix "S/PRST/****/*" followed by the year and number of the statement. 7 More recently, the text of "Presidential Statements" issued since 1994 has also been made available in a separate category on the United Nation's website. 8 Despite its prominence in the practice of the Security Council the status and legal implications of presidential statements as well as their politicodiplomatic role seem far from clear. In June 1995, Argentina expressed its "serious concerns" about the fact that "the scope, content and nature" of these statements has never been defined and suggested that the Working Group of the 3 Rules 11 and 22 only refer to "statements" by the See below section II. A. 5 1992, 1994, and 1997 . For the numbers see Annex 1. 6 See Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly (for the period of 16 June 1992 to 15 June 1993): UN Doc. A/48/2, 19 October 1993, Appendix VI, 490-496. Security Council concerning the Council's documentation and other procedural questions make, without delay, "the necessary effort to bring a minimum of clarity and transparency to a situation that could be defined as somewhat confused." 9 While treatises on the Council's resolutions are legion, presidential statements have not attracted much attention in the literature. 10 In so far as they have, views on their political significance are contradictory: for some, they "have little, if any, effect", 11 while for others their role in the "Council's handling of a particular problem cannot be underestimated, and certainly should not be overlooked". 12 Equally, opinion on their legal status is divided. According to Paul Tavernier:
Les déclarations présidentielles […] sont très largement assimilables à des résolutions, par leurs effets juridiques, politiques ou pratiques. […] Il nous semble que rien de s'oppose à l'assimilation, ou à la quasi-assimilation, des déclarations présidentielles, aux résolutions du conseil de sécurité en ce qui concerne leur valeur et leur effets juridiques: elle peuvent contenir, comme les résolutions, des recommandations ou des décisions obligatoires. 13 Anthony Aust, on the other hand, states:
[…] increasingly the views of the Council are expressed by statements made by the President. These are not generally regarded as having the same status as a resolution.
[…] Typically they are used to express the opinion of the Council on a matter which does not require the formality of a resolution. The Council may wish to warn a Government or other body 9 Letter dated 2 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council: UN Doc. S/1995/456*, 9 June 1995, 2 and 3. Already in 1993 UN Under-Secretary-General, James O.C. Jonah, identified the legal implications of presidential statements as one of the questions to which "urgent attention should be given", see Differing State Perspectives on the United Nations in the Post-Cold War World, 4 ACUNS Reports and Papers (1993) , available at http: //www.acuns.wlu.ca/publications. that its conduct might result in action being taken by the Council […] . 14 As these statements show, an effort to bring a minimum of clarity and transparency to the practice of expressing the sense of the Security Council in presidential statements is more than overdue.
II. Presidential Statements and Other Statements by the President Distinguished

II.A. From Summing-up Statements by the President to Presidential Statements
The practice of the President of the Security Council making statements on behalf of the Council has evolved over the years. As early as the seventh meeting of the Council on 4 February 1946, in discussions concerning the Greek question, the representative of Poland proposed that the President make a "statement" expressing the sense of the Council that it would "take note of the statements setting out the declarations of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and Greece, and of the assurances given by the representative of the United Kingdom that British troops in Greece will be withdrawn as soon as possible, and considers the question closed." 15 The proposal submitted by the Polish representative was rejected by the members of the Security Council. 16 Two days later, the President read another statement which, in his view, might be accepted as a statement of the Council. 17 Upon protest by Council members, the President withdrew his statement in favor of the following text of a statement, prepared by the representatives of the USSR and the United States:
and consider the matter as closed. 18 Presidential statements have come a long way since this first rather hollow statement-not only with respect to their content. 19 In the early years of the Council the statements were, as a rule, made by the President at the end of a formal meeting summing up the views of the members of the Council or the general trend of the discussion, interpreting the consensus of opinion which had emerged in the debate in the Council, summarizing the position of the Council, expressing the sense of the Security Council or just winding up the debate. No objections being made, the President then declared the consensus adopted by the Council. It is in this sense that the term "President's statement" was initially used in the "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council". 20 The first time the President expressly spoke on behalf of the Council was on 11 November 1954 when he stated that "The Council considers […] ", "The Council thinks […]", and "The Council appeals to both parties […] ". 21 At the 1233 rd meeting of the Security Council on 26 July 1965 another important change in the practice of the Council occurred. While the President had formerly summed up the views expressed in the debate during formal public meetings of the Council, the statements were now used as a vehicle to report what had been agreed by the (members of the) Council in informal consultations of the whole. The President now stated that "after consultations held among the members of the Council, he had been authorized by the members of the Council to present the following summing up of the discussion held during the past few meetings of the Council on the Dominican situation." 22 Statements by the President consequently were no longer made at the end of formal meetings but at their beginning or, if the formal meeting had been adjourned for informal consultations, after its resumption. The 1233 rd meeting of the Council may thus be considered the "birthday" of presidential statements in their modern sense. The formula nowadays used to introduce a presidential statement, i.e. that following consultations of the Council or with the members of the Council, the President has been authorized to make the following statement was first employed on 25 November 1967 when the President stated that, "after holding consultations with members of the Council, I have been authorized to make the 18 Ibid., 171-172. 19 On the content of presidential statements, see below section IV. 20 See, e.g., Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Supplement 1952 Supplement -1955 Supplement (1957 ibid. 1956 -1958 (1959 ibid. 1959 -1963 (1965 SCOR, 9 th year, 685 th meeting, 11 November 1954, 3-4, para. 15. 22 SCOR, 20 th year, 1233 rd meeting, 26 July 1965, 1-2, para. 2.
following statement on behalf of the Council". 23 Another noteworthy change in the Security Council's practice concerned documentation. The consensus of 9-10 July 1967 expressed by the President, approving the stationing of United Nations observers along the Suez Canal, was not only printed in the official verbatim records of the Council 24 but, in addition, was also issued separately as an official document of the Security Council. 25 This paved the way for yet another development: on 8 December 1967, a presidential statement, for the first time, was not made in a formal meeting of the Council but, instead, was only issued as a Security Council document. UN Document S/8289, headed "Statement by the President of the Security Council" reads as follows:
The following statement is circulated in connexion with the report of the Secretary-General on the observation of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector (S/8053/Add.3). After consultations I have had with the representatives, I understand there is no objection to my transmittal of this statement as reflecting the view of the members of the Council:
"As regards document S/8053/Add.3, brought to the attention of the Security Council, the members, recalling the consensus reached at its 1366 th meeting on 9 July 1967, recognize the necessity of the enlargement by the Secretary-General of the number of observers in the Suez Canal zone and the provision of additional technical material and means of transportation." 26
This practice of publishing statements by the President as official documents of the Security Council-first, in the "S/*" series and, since January 1994, in the "S/PRST/****/*" series-has been followed with very few exceptions ever since, 27 irrespective of whether the statement was read out in a formal public or private 28 meeting of the Council, was made to the media or was just transmitted by the President to the UN Secretariat for publication. This rule advanced by Aust, above n. 14, 371 is refuted by the conflicting examples in n. 32 and in the text to n. 39.
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See, e.g., UN Docs. S/24541, 10 September 1992; S/24542, 9 September 1992; S/ PRST/1996 /10, 4 March 1996 . The text of the statement, however, spoke of "the members of the Security Council".
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See, e.g., UN Doc. S/24872, 30 November 1992. 34 See, e.g., UN Docs. S/25185, 28 January 1993; S/23500, 31 January 1992; S/23945, 18 May 1992; S/22917, 9 August 1991; S/21400, 19 July 1990; S/17554, 9 October 1985. 35 UN Doc. S/12724, 31 May 1975. 36 UN Doc. S/25557, 8 April 1993. made "to the media on behalf of the Council". 37 In 1993, however, a trend emerged to regard statements that were read out by the President during formal meetings as being made "on behalf of the Council". It was argued by the United Kingdom that those statements which simply arose out of the work of the Council during informal meetings should be made, on the other hand, "on behalf of the members of the Council". This was opposed by Argentina which argued that no such distinction should be made allowing for "the essential minimum of flexibility needed on this issue." 38 While the UK's suggestion to rename statements made on behalf of the Security Council "Statements on behalf of the Security Council" instead of "Statements by the President of the Security Council" was not successful, her other proposal was acted upon. Since March 1996 statements "on behalf of the Council" have, without exception, been read out in formal meetings of the Security Council. S/PRST/1996/10 was the last "statement to the press on behalf of the Council". 39 When on 4 August 2000 a statement to the media was inadvertently made "on behalf of the Council" the respective Council document S/ PRST/2000/27 headed "Statement by the President of the Security Council" was withdrawn 40 and five days later the statement was reissued as UN Document S/2000/772 entitled "Note by the President of the Security Council". The text of the two documents was identical with the sole exception that in the "Note" the statement to the media was no longer made on behalf of the Council but "on behalf of the members of the Council". 41 While both the Security Council and the UN Secretariat have strictly observed this distinction in terminology, it has not always been appreciated by individual members of the Council. Thus, the report on Mauritius' presidency of the Security Council in January 2002, referring to S/PRST/2002/1, speaks of a "statement on behalf of the members of the Council" 42 although the statement was, in fact, made "on behalf of the Council". 43 37 UN Doc. S/ INF/49, 1994, 5 . Similar discrepancies exist for example in the case of UN Docs. S/24720, 27 October 1992 ("on behalf of the Council") and S/ INF/48, 1993, 88 ("on behalf of the members of the Council") and S/22322, 3 March 1991 ("on behalf of the Council") and S/ INF/47, 1993, 9 ("on behalf of the members of the Council") and S/20554, 31 March 1989 ("on behalf of the Council") and S/ INF/45, 1990, 8 ("on behalf of the members of the Council").
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Letter dated 2 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council: UN Doc. S/1995 S/ /456*, 9 June 1995 S/ PRST/1996 /10, 4 March 1996 .The text of the statement, however, spoke of "the members of the Security Council". 45 For the President to make a statement on behalf of the Council after informal consultations would give these meetings an official status which they do not have. In fact, the Council could express its views on matters of which it had never been formally seized and which never appeared on its agenda, i.e., matters which it had never officially dealt with.
Presidential statements may nowadays be defined as statements on behalf of the Security Council read out by the President in a formal meeting after the text of the statement has been agreed upon at informal consultations of the whole.
II.B. Statements by the President to the Press
Presidential statements are to be distinguished from statements to the press by the President of the Security Council. This is shown, for example, by Slovenia's report on the assessment of work of the Security Council for the month of August 1998 which reads in relevant part:
During the month of August, the Security Council held 9 formal meetings and its members met 17 times in informal consultations. The Council adopted 5 resolutions and issued 3 presidential statements.
[…] At the end of each meeting at which informal consultations were held, the President briefed the press. The President spoke on behalf of the members of the Security Council on several occasions, delivering a total of 15 oral statements had decided on 12 June 1997 that each State holding the presidency of the Security Council would produce a report that would be attached to the annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly (UN Doc. S/1997/451 to the press. 46 Some confusion has been caused by the fact that until March 1996 presidential statements have, on several occasions, also been related to the press. 47 In addition, since July 2001 both presidential statements 48 and statements to the press by the President are issued by the Secretariat as "United Nations press releases", upon clearance by the President, under the series symbol "SC/*" 49 which sometimes makes it difficult to distinguish between the two instruments.
Matters have been further complicated by the fact that, in recent Security Council practice, two types of oral statements to the press are to be distinguished. First, there are statements to the press made by the President "on behalf of the members of the Security Council". Thus, the Netherlands stated in the report on their presidency of the Security Council in September 1999 that "the President addressed the news media after each session of informal consultations. On 11 occasions he was authorized to make statements to the press on specific issues on behalf of the Council members." 50 As with presidential statements their text or at least its elements 51 is agreed upon beforehand by the members of the Security Council during informal consultations. Due to their similarities with presidential statements these statements to the press may also be termed "presidential press statements". The number of presidential press statements has increased considerably over the last few years while at the same time the number of presidential statements has decreased. 52 Many pronouncements of the Security Council which have formerly been contained in a presidential statement are now conveyed in press statements. 53 See the examples n. 30 above. 48 An unofficial version of the text of presidential statements is reproduced in the press release summarizing the account of the formal meeting at which the statement was read out. The official version is printed in the "S/PRST/****/*" series and in the verbatim records of the Council meeting. The outcome of the review of a sanctions regime which was formerly conveyed in may let their collective opinion on a matter dealt with in informal consultations be known and send a message to the parties concerned. Although the content of a presidential press statement may differ little from that of a presidential statement they, nevertheless, have different functions and legal status. 54 A presidential press statement may be chosen as a first reaction to a development, later followed by a more detailed reaction in a presidential statement. 55 Sometimes, presidential press statements have also been employed to announce the adoption of a presidential statement in due course. For example, in a statement to the press on 26 November 2002 the President announced that "members of the Council are going to work on a presidential statement of a comprehensive strategy on Liberia." 56 This was followed several days later by a 5-page long presidential statement on the situation in Liberia. 57 The basic difference between the two types of statements is that in the case of a presidential statement it is the United Nations organ Security Council which acts while in the case of a presidential press statement it is the President that reports the collective political will or action of the members of the Council. This is also borne out by the different formulations used: presidential statements, as a rule, are phrased in the present tense while presidential press statements are phrased in the past tense. Thus, in the presidential statement "The Security Council calls upon the parties […] ." 58 In the presidential press statement, on the other hand, the President (only) reports that "The members of the Security Council called on the parties […]". 59 Secondly, the President of the Security Council may also issue statements to the press on his own account. These press briefings by the President after each presidential statements (see text to n. 144) is nowadays conveyed in presidential press statements; see, e.g., SC/6922, 15 September 2000. session of informal consultations have become a regular feature in recent years and are part of the measures to improve the transparency of the Council's work. Contrary to presidential press statements, as a rule, not even the elements of these statements are formally agreed by Council members during informal consultations. It is rather largely left to the discretion of the President to formulate the text of these statements after discussions on their broad outline. 60 The distinction between presidential press statements and other statements to the press by the President has not always been appreciated. Thus, during its presidency of the Security Council in February 1999 Canada made available on its website twenty-three "Statements to the Press by the President of the Security Council". 61 However, only thirteen of these were presidential press statements as becomes clear from Canada's report on its presidency of the Security Council which states that "the President regularly addressed the media after informal consultations of the whole. On 13 occasions the President made statements to the press on specific issues on behalf of Council members." 62 The other statements just reproduced the "lines to the media" used by the President in his press briefings. Presidential press briefings and presidential press statements may be distinguished by the fact that the latter, as a rule, start with the introductory remark that "The members of the Security Council have authorized me to make the following statement to the press regarding […]" or that "I have been authorized by the members of the Security Council to make the following statement to the press on […]." 63 
III. The Procedure of Adopting Presidential Statements
III.A. How Presidential Statements Are Adopted
The Security Council may hold formal public (open) or private (closed) meetings in the Council chamber or informal consultations of the whole, i.e. private gatherings of all the Council members in a special consultation room next to the Council chamber, presided over by the Council President who notifies each member in advance of the time and program of work to be discussed. 64 Presidential statements are essentially a product of these informal consultations. The rise in their numbers is closely linked to the proliferation of informal consultations since the late 1980s. 65 There is no standard procedure for drafting presidential statements. A typical draft presidential statement might go through four stages: 66 At the beginning, the President alone or in consultation with some Council members or one member or a group of members may prepare a draft presidential statement. This draft will usually take the form of a "working paper" which has no document symbol number and no official status. Often set groups working on a particular issue, such as "the Friends of X" or the "X-Troika", may submit a first draft after intensive negotiations between them on the underlying policy. For example, S/PRST/2000/8 of 14 March 2000 was originally submitted by Argentina "on behalf of the friends of Haiti". 67 The first draft need not be a full text but may just contain elements for a statement.
The second stage is to share informally the draft statement with each of the Council members: this may be done bilaterally or with groups on the Council or in the course of informal consultations of the whole. Presidential statements are drafted and negotiated in one or two languages, English and, occasionally, French. For Council members to submit a draft presidential statement for circulation as an official Council document is the exception and will usually have political reasons. 68 There will be a preliminary discussion of the major points, and 64 These are also knows as "global consultations", "informals", or "formal informals". On informal consultations, see the authors, above n. 45.
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Bailey and Daws, above n. 44, 35. A " It is important that all members of the Security Council be allowed to participate fully in the preparation of the […] statements by the President of the Council.
[…] The drafting of […] statements by the President of the Council should be carried out in a manner that will allow adequate participation of all members of the Council. While the need is recognized for the Council, in many instances, to adopt its decisions expeditiously, sufficient time should be allowed for consultations of all members of the Council and for their own consideration of the drafts, prior to action by the Council on specific items. 69 At the third stage, all Council members enter into a detailed paragraph by paragraph discussion of the draft statement in informal consultations of the whole. These consultations may take several hours or even days and may result in changes to the original draft or total redrafts. Unlike in the case of draft resolutions, there are no draft presidential statements "in blue". 70 The parties concerned are usually consulted or informed during the negotiation process. Since January 2000, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the President of the Council makes draft presidential statements available to States that are not members of the Council as part of the Council's drive for transparency as soon as they are introduced in informal consultations of the whole. 71 In recent Security of the Security Council at the time, submitted a draft statement by the President of the Security Council concerning the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Security Council's debate of 12 January 1976 on the situation in the Middle East which was circulated as UN Doc. S/11889, 30 November 1975. 69 UN Doc. S/1999 S/ /165, 17 February 1999 . See also the non-paper on the preparation of resolutions and presidential statements presented on 28 August 1998 by the President of the Council (Slovenia) to the informal working group on Security Council procedure and documentation: "In order to prepare the […] presidential statements of the Security Council adequately it is important that such preparations include all the interested members of the Security Council. Contributions made by members of groups of friends for a particular situation and by other similar arrangements are welcome. The preparation of […] presidential statements must be managed in a manner allowing adequate insight of all members of the Security Council into the process of preparation. In particular, sufficient time must be allowed for consultations of all the members of the Security Council and for their own consideration of the drafts prior to action of the Security Council." (UN Doc. A/54/2, 1999, 396) . Council practice, draft presidential statements are sometimes also made available on the website of the presidency and their availability is announced in the daily Journal of the United Nations. 72 At the end of informal consultations the text of the presidential statement is adopted by consensus, i.e. without any formal objection. 73 In the earlier practice of the Security Council, China has, on occasions, dissociated itself from a presidential statement. For example, at its 1764 th meeting, on 28 February 1974, the President read a statement on the question of the complaint by Iraq concerning incidents on its frontier with Iran which reads in part:
1. Following the complaint presented on 12 February 1974 by the representative of Iraq […] the President of the Security Council has had consultations with all the members of the Council and with the Permanent Representative of Iran. As a result, the president has found that there exists within the Council a consensus in the following terms.
[…] 6. The above-mentioned consensus was reached by the members of the Council with the exception of China which dissociates itself from it; the Chinese delegation made the following statement: "[…] the Chinese delegation does not favor United Nations involvement in any form in a boundary dispute. In view of this position, the Chinese delegation dissociates itself from the above consensus of the Security Council." 74 Although a Council member has dissociated itself from the presidential statement S/1999 S/ /1291 S/ , 30 December 1999 also it may nevertheless be considered as an outcome of consensus as the reservation is presented as an integral part of the presidential statement. One may therefore speak of a presidential statement adopted by "qualified consensus". Statements that have met with opposition of individual Council members or which have been reached only "by the majority of the members" 75 are, on the other hand, -due to lack of consensus-not considered as presidential statements. 76 Michael Wood has pointed out that the consensus procedure leads to the paradoxical situation that it may be easier to secure the adoption of a resolution than that of a presidential statement. 77 Presidential statements might be considered more democratic than resolutions as all Council members have, in principle, a veto right. In practice, however, the dynamics of negotiations for a presidential statement ensure even greater influence on the text to be adopted by the more powerful members.
Finally, the text agreed by the members in informal consultations is read out by the President in a formal public meeting of the Security Council. It is only at this stage that the presidential statement is officially adopted by the Security Council as an organ of the United Nations, as informal consultations of the whole are not meetings of the Council under the terms of the Charter but only meetings of the members of the Council, a distinction that has been rigorously maintained. 78 The consequence of this is that any Council member may thwart a presidential statement at the last moment by objecting to it in the formal meeting of the Council. The meetings in which these statements are read out often take just a few, sometimes only two, minutes: they are mere pro forma occasions. The Italian representative to the United Nations, Franceso Paolo Fulci, has called them "almost liturgical". 79 Only when the text is read out will the presidential statement be translated into the six official working languages of the United Nations. Draft resolutions, on the other hand, are translated into all working languages as soon as they are issued in provisional form (i.e. "in blue"). The text of presidential statements is well documented: First, it is recorded in the verbatim records of the Council meeting, secondly, it is published as an official UN document in the "S/PRST/****/*" series and, thirdly, an unofficial version of the text is reproduced in the UN press release summarizing the account of the meeting in which the statement was read out. In addition, the Secretariat has been mandated to bring presidential statements to the knowledge of those concerned 75 Cf., e.g., the statement reached at consultations between members of the Council "on behalf of the majority of the members" on the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
III.B. Consequences of Adopting Presidential Statements in Informal Consultations
Informal consultations of the whole essentially differ from formal meetings of the Security Council, public or private, in that only members of the Security Council can attend. 81 Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Security Council as well as States not members of the United Nations whose interests are specifically affected by a question discussed in informal consultations or which are parties to a dispute under consideration in informal consultations cannot present their views to Council members in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the UN Charter 82 as these provisions only apply to formal "meetings of the Security Council". 83 The same is true for the participation of non-State actors in informal consultations under Rule 39 the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure. A proposal made by the Czech Republic in 1996 that non-members of the Council should be allowed to participate in informal consultations of the whole on a discretionary basis whenever their interests are specifically Cf. the speech of the President of the Security Council before the General Assembly introducing the Council's annual report: UN Doc. A/51/PV.65, 26 November 1996, 10. 82 Art. 31 states: "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specifically affected." Art. 32 states: "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any State which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute." That these discussions take place in "meetings" of the Council becomes clear from Art. 28, paras. 2 and 3, of the UN Charter and Rule 14 of the Council's Rules of Procedure.
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New Zealand takes the (minority) view that Arts. 31, 32 UN Charter also apply to informal consultations of the whole: UN Doc. S/PV.3483, 16 December 1994, 10-11. 84 The participation of non-members of the Council in formal meetings in accordance with Art. 31 UN Charter is always discretionary. A right to be invited to participate may only exist under Art. 32 UN Charter, see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971, 16 at 22, paras. 24-25. has not been taken up. 85 States and other actors affected by a presidential statement are thus given no opportunity to present their views directly to Council members during the discussion of a draft presidential statement or to participate in the negotiation of the statement. For a long time, non-members of the Council were not even aware of what was discussed in informal consultations. It is only since October 1994 that the President briefs non-members on the current work of the Council being undertaken in informal consultations and since 1995 that a brief agenda of these consultations is printed in the daily UN Journal but such meetings may, of course, also be held at short notice without being previously announced in the UN Journal. Thus, non-members may only lobby individual Council members outside the consultation room or, if the draft text of a statement has been made public, write to the President of the Council and formally suggest alterations. But, the latter is the exception and indicates that lobbying has failed. For example, on 21 December 1995 the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations sent a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he made suggestions and proposed amendments to a draft presidential statement which was to be read out during the next formal session of the Council. In order to put on record Angola's view he also requested that the letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council. 86 The presidential statement on "The situation in Angola", however, was adopted on the same day without any alterations being made to the original draft. 87 Not only are non-members of the Council given no hearing during the negotiations of a draft presidential statement, they are also given no opportunity to comment on a presidential statement when it is read out at a formal public meeting of the Council. This time, the problem is not that there is no "meeting" of the Security Council, but that Articles 31 and 32 of the UN Charter only provide for participation of non-members of the Council "in the discussion" of a question. At the stage when presidential statements are read out no discussion takes place any more. The formal public meetings, which usually last for no more than a few minutes, only serve as a stage for the President to read out statements on questions discussed previously in informal consultations. The only possibility for non-members of the Security Council to publicize their reaction to a presidential statement is to send a letter setting out their position to the Council President and to ask for it to be circulated as an official document of the Security S/1995 S/ /1052 S/ , 21 December 1995 See S/ PRST/1995 /62, 21 December 1995 Council. 88 The consequence of this procedure is that interested States and other actors are given no forum to address Council members on presidential statements. This has led ten elected members of the Security Council in December 1997 to suggest in a position paper on the working methods of the Security Council that "the Security Council should consider allowing States non-members of the Council to make statements at the meetings in which a statement is made by the President on behalf of the members of the Council." 89 Another suggestion to improve Council procedure which so far has not been acted upon.
It may be argued that the participation of the addressees of a presidential statement in the negotiations of the draft text in informal consultations and their presence during the reading out of the statement (by analogy with Articles 31 and 32 of the UN Charter) 90 might secure their agreement more easily and thus enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council's action. On the other hand, the present procedure avoids acrimonious exchanges in public which might be counterproductive in case of sensitive issues. Furthermore, the presence during informal consultations of representatives of States to which a presidential statement is to be addressed might inhibit the discussions of Council members and shift negotiations of presidential statements to even more informal forums.
Another significant difference between informal consultations of the whole and formal meetings is that no official records are kept of these consultations. 91 The United Nations Secretariat takes notes for their own internal purpose as well as sound recordings but these are not available to others. 92 The negotiating history of presidential statements is thus not on the public record. This means that it is 88 E.g., Croatia's reaction to the presidential statement of 15 July 1999 (S/26084) was set out in a letter dated 16 July 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council: UN Doc. S/26097, 16 July 1993. For South Africa's reaction to the presidential statement of 21 September 1979 calling for the non-recognition of the Bantustans, see UN Doc. S/13552, 24 September 1979. 89 Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council: UN Doc. A/53/47, 5 August 1999, 59 -60 at 59. The position paper is also attached to UN Doc. A/52/861-S/1998 A/52/861-S/ /286, 31 March 1998 . The paper was considered by the Council in informal consultations on 23 December 1997, ibid., 4.
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That there is some flexibility in opening up informal consultations of the whole to nonmembers of the Council may be seen in the new practice of inviting newly elected members of the Council to attend informal consultations for a period of one or two months immediately preceding their term of membership, see UN Doc. S/2002 S/ /1276 S/ , 22 November 2002 According to Tavernier, above n. 10, 99, presidential statements serve, although in a less than perfect way, as a substitute for verbatim records.
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Wood, above n. 66, 94, n. 33. not normally known who introduced a draft presidential statement, what positions individual Council members took, how consensus was achieved or what the motivation behind the consensus was. It is not very often that Council members chose to make public their views expressed during the process of adopting a presidential statement by way of a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council to be circulated as an official document of the Security Council. 93 Similarly, the practice of Council members explaining their understanding of a presidential statement in the public meeting in which it is read out by the President has remained the exception. 94 This is of relevance for the interpretation of presidential statements. Although Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 95 are not directly applicable, the methods set forth therein for the interpretation of treaties may, with certain qualifications, be applied by analogy to presidential statements. In the case of presidential statements, given their essentially political nature and the way they are drafted, the negotiating history may be useful (even more useful that in the case of treaties) to establish the object and purpose of a statement (Article 31, paragraph 1) and the intention of Council members as to a special meaning to be given to a term in a statement (Article 31, paragraph 4) and as a supplementary means of interpretation (Article 32). The procedure employed to adopt presidential statements, however, means that much material that could be useful is simply not available. But this is not a problem confined to presidential statements. 96 The question of how presidential statements should be adopted is part of the wider question of the Council's working methods and whether these should be more transparent. Here, it is submitted, a balance has to be struck between the international community's justified demand for more transparency in procedure and Council members' legitimate concern for confidentiality. As pointed out by the United Nations Secretariat, when dealing with these questions, "transparency 93 E.g., on 1 December 1993 the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN sent a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he forwarded the text of a statement made by the Brazilian delegation on 23 November 1993 in the informal consultations prior to the issuance on that date of the presidential statement on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. The statement read in part: "As we have made clear on previous occasions […] , it is the understanding of the Brazilian Government that the decisions taken by the Security Council with respect to the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait in resolution 687 (1993 [sic] ), or as a result of that resolution, as in the case in the proposed presidential statement, can only be justified in the light of the exceptional and unique circumstances in which those decisions were taken and do not establish a legal precedent." (UN Doc. S/26831, 1 December 1993 
IV. The Content of Presidential Statements
Presidential statements vary widely in size and content. While some consist of only a single paragraph others are several pages long. 99 Unlike resolutions, they are not divided into a preamble and an operative part and individual paragraphs, as a rule, are not numbered. 100 As in the case of resolutions, an annex may be attached to the statement. 101 The content of a presidential statement may differ little from that of a resolution. Indeed, over the years more and more pronouncements of the Security Council which initially would have been There is, however, the possibility of so-called "Aria formula" meetings. On these, see Bailey and Daws, above n. 44, [73] [74] E.g., the presidential statement of 31 January 1992 (UN Doc. S/23500), made at the conclusion of the 3046 th meeting of the Security Council, held at the level of Heads of State and Government, is five pages long and contains a programmatic statement on the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 109 all States to refrain from providing military support to a rebel group and to prevent armed individuals from using their national territory to prepare and commit attacks in neighboring countries, 110 or all Governments to deny any form of recognition to the so-called "independent" Bantustans to refrain from any dealings with them and to reject travel documents issued by them. 111 The Security Council has "urged" the parties to provide their full and prompt cooperation with a Boundary Commission, 112 the Government and the combatants to provide unrestricted access to UN humanitarian agencies and nongovernmental organizations to areas where refugees need assistance, 113 or the parties and countries concerned to abide by the provisions of relevant resolutions of the Security Council. 114 It has also "appealed" to all parties to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated political solution, 115 to the parties to comply strictly with their obligations undertaken in an agreement, 116 and to Member States and humanitarian organizations to increase their assistance to a country. 117 These examples are by no means exhaustive and are only intended to illustrate the wideranging use of presidential statements. Besides, the Security Council has regularly addressed requests to the Secretary-General to submit reports or proposals, supply it with information, or to establish panels, working groups or offices. 118 It has also employed presidential statements to set out its collective opinion on a certain issue, to publish internal organizational decisions, 119 to establish subsidiary organs in accordance with Article 29 of the UN Charter, 120 to reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States under attack or falling apart, 121 to express its support for the legitimate and democratically elected Government of a State threatened by armed opposition, 122 to welcome encourage or, more often, condemn an action, to take note of or express its concern about a particular situation, to record its gratitude or appreciation, to reiterate the content of its earlier resolutions, or to remind States and other parties to a dispute of their obligations.
The Security Council has also utilized presidential statements to make quasi-judicial determinations. Thus, it declared the proclamation of the South African Bantustans as independent States as "totally invalid", 123 held that the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and humanitarian relief essential for the survival of the civilian population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina "constitutes a violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949", 124 noted that the provisions of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees do not apply to those responsible for serious breaches of international humanitarian law and acts of genocide in Rwanda, 125 found that the deployment of Croatian armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina "constitutes a violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and relevant Security Council resolutions", 126 and termed Iraq in "material breach of resolution 687 (1991)". 127 Presidential statements have further been employed to protect the United Nation's legal position. When in April 1992 the Yugoslav Permanent Mission to the United Nations sent a letter to the Secretary-General, in which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)-FRY-claimed to continue the State, international, legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the President on 5 May 1992 issued a statement in which the members of the Security Council agreed that the circulation of the letter in question which was scheduled for the next day "does not prejudge decisions that may be taken by appropriate United Nations bodies […] on this matter." 128 Such a decision was taken only four and a half months later when the Security Council on 21 September adopted resolution 777 (1992) , in which it found that the FRY could not continue automatically the membership of the former SFRY in the United Nations. Presidential statements have served yet another purpose.
Over the last few years, the Security Council has taken various measures to enhance its working methods and transparency. These changes in Council practice, however, have not resulted in amendments of the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure but were institutionalized by way of incorporating them into statements and notes of the President. 129 What may be even more interesting than the content of past presidential statements is what has not been dealt with in such statements. Thus, the Security Council has regularly resorted to a resolution when establishing a peacekeeping force. It has, however, used presidential statements to decide on the composition of an established peacekeeping force, 130 on the question of increasing the numbers of peacekeepers, 131 and on the deployment of members of a force in a new sector 125 S/ PRST/1994 /59, 14 October 1994 S/PRST/1994 /6, 3 February 1994 . See also S/ PRST/1998 /1, 14 January 1998 ("clear violation of the relevant resolutions"). 127 UN Doc. S/25091, 11 January 1993. 128 132 The form of a presidential statement has also been chosen for the announcement that the necessary agreement did not currently exist in the Council for a decision to be adopted to change the modalities of an existing peacekeeping operation. 133 Recommendations of the Security Council on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter have also been made in the form of a resolution only. The presidential statements which have been issued on such occasions since 1991 are only complementary to these resolutions and are no more than a gesture of courtesy. 134 The Security Council has also never imposed, terminated, or suspended sanctions in a presidential statement. It has, however, utilized statements by its President to announce a decision "to defer temporarily the imposition of additional measures" (if the imposition of further sanctions had been promised in a resolution in case of non-compliance) 135 or to formally record the termination or suspension of a sanctions regime. For example, in paragraph 8 of resolution 1192 (1998) the Security Council had "decided" that the sanctions against Libya set forth in resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1003) PRST/1994 /45, 12 August 1994 and S/RES/932 (1994 , 30 June 1994, para. 5. 136 S/ RES/1192 RES/ (1998 , 27 August 1998, para. 8. 137 UN Doc. S/1999 S/ /378, 5 April 1999 SC/6662, 5 April 1999 which stated, in the relevant part, that "Security Council President of the Council read out a presidential statement in which the Security Council noted that, with the Secretary-General's letter of 5 April 1999, the conditions set forth in resolution 1192 (1998) for the immediate suspension of the sanctions had been fulfilled and recalled that, "in accordance with the resolution", the sanctions had been immediately suspended upon receipt of the letter of the Secretary-General on 5 April 1999 at 14.00 Eastern Standard Time. 139 This presidential statement was a reaction to a letter from the members of the Council of the League of Arab States to the President of the Security Council in which these States emphasized that:
it is important for the Security Council to a adopt a resolution in which it confirms the suspension of the above measures, all the more so in that Security Council resolution 1192 (1998), paragraph 8, does not oppose the adoption of a clear resolution by the Council announcing the suspension of these measures and does not deny the need for such a resolution. 140 The member States of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries also expressed the view "that the suspension of the sanctions should have been effected through a formal resolution of the Security Council [and not a presidential statement] in order to put the matter on a sound legal basis." 141 A similar position was taken by the Islamic Group at the United Nations which expressed the view that "the suspension of the sanctions should also have been embodied in a resolution […] so as to place the question in its correct legal framework." 142 As resolution 1192 (1998) itself had provided for the suspension of the sanctions, by specifying a particular terminating event, no further resolution was legally required and none was adopted by the Security Council. Similarly, the termination date for the sanctions imposed on Eritrea and Ethiopia by resolution 1298 (2000) was set out in the resolution itself. In its paragraph 16 the Security Council decided that the measures imposed were established for twelve months and that, at the end of that period, it would decide whether the two States had complied with the conditions set out in the resolution and whether to extend the sanctions for a further period with the same conditions. As the Security Council recognized in informal consultations of the whole that the two States had complied with the conditions, it members looked forward to […] the immediate suspension of sanctions […] ." 139 S/ PRST/1999 /10, 8 April 1999 UN Doc. S/1999 /397, 8 April 1999 See the letter dated 20 April 1999 addressed to the UN Secretary-General: UN Doc. S/1999 S/ /726, 30 June 1999 . An almost identical formulation was used in a letter of the Group of African States to the Secretary-General dated 13 April 1999, see ibid., 3, para. 10. 142 UN Doc. S/1999 S/ /466, 22 April 1999 only remained for it to note in a presidential statement that, "in accordance with paragraph 16 of resolution 1298 (2000) of 17 May 2000, the arms embargo on the parties expires on 16 May 2001." 143 In the case of sanctions resolutions which contain a "sunset clause" presidential statements thus perform a kind of notary function formally documenting the end of the sanctions regime. In addition, the Security Council has used presidential statements to announce the outcome of the review of a sanctions regime. From 1991 to 1995 it was common practice for the President to issue statements on the sanctions imposed against Iraq and Libya along the following lines: "The members of the Security Council held informal consultations [pursuant to the relevant resolutions]. After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of the consultations, the President of the Council concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for a modification of the [sanctions] regime." 144 The most important measure in the arsenal of the Security Council, the authorization of the use of force, has also been reserved to resolutions. No reference may be found in presidential statements to the wording usually used in this context: "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations" and the authorization of the "use of all necessary means". 145 The same holds good for express determinations, in accordance with Article 39 of the UN Charter, that a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Mention of such threats has been made only in passing. 146 It has been argued that presidential statements may be used by the Security Council to countenance the use of force pursuant to an earlier resolution. 147 While it is true that the Security Council may authoritatively determine that the conditions for the use of force set out in a resolution are fulfilled and may thus trigger the authorization, especially if the resolution has been adopted several years ago, the basic requirement in such a case is that the resolution, in fact, authorizes the use of force under the conditions in question. Contrary to what Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner argue, 148 the air strikes launched by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France on 13 and 18 January 1993 and the allied missile attack of 17 January 1993 on Iraqi targets were not covered by the authorization to use force contained in resolution 678 (1990) . The fact that the Security Council, in its presidential statement of 11 January 1993, had found Iraq "in material breach of resolution 687 (1991)", 149 as it had done previously, 150 could not reactivate resolution 678 (1990) as this resolution only authorized Member States to use all necessary means "to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area". 151 All subsequent resolutions only referred to the resolutions adopted prior to resolution 678 (1990) as becomes clear from the list of relevant resolutions adopted since resolution 660 (1990) contained in paragraph 1 of the preamble of resolution 678 (1990) . It is highly unlikely that the Council intended to give individual member States a blank authorization to uphold all future resolutions on Iraq by force of arms. In this context, it is also of relevance that in its presidential statement adopted on 11 January 1993 the Security Council reaffirmed that, in resolutions 687 (1991) and 773 (1991) , it had guaranteed the inviolability of the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq and that it had undertaken "to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." In addition, the presidential statement warned "of the serious consequences that will flow" from the continued defiance of resolution 687 (1991) closing with the formula that "the Council will remain actively seized of the matter." All this speaks against the position that three Council members were allowed to decide on their own only three days later that, in their view, it was now appropriate to launch air strikes against Iraq. Even more questionable seems the opinion that a use of force without any legal basis in a prior resolution may be authorized ex post facto by a presidential statement. 152 148 Ibid., 151-152. 149 UN Doc. S/25091, 11 January 1993. 150 Already in the presidential statement of 19 February 1992 the Council had found that Iraq's behavior constitutes "a continuing material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991)." (UN Doc. S/23609, 19 February 1992) . See also S/ PRST/1996 / 11, 19 March 1996 where the Council termed Iraq's actions "a clear violation by Iraq of the provisions of resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) ." 151 S/ RES/678 (1990 ), 29 November 1990 For this view, see Nowrot and Shabacker, above n. 13, 362-363.
V. The Legal Status of Presidential Statements
V.A. Decisions of the Security Council
The terms resolution, letter, note, or (presidential) statement only describe the form in which the Security Council acts and do not allow one to draw conclusions as to the legal nature of the action. The distinction is thus not between decisions and recommendations on the one hand and presidential statements and other "softer" forms of action on the other hand but between the form and the legal nature of an action. 153 Whether presidential statements may convey or themselves be "decisions" of the Security Council must be determined on the basis of the UN Charter and the practice of the Security Council. 154 The term "decisions of the Security Council" in Article 27 of the UN Charter refers to all types of actions which the Security Council may take. According to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the provision "Decisions of the Security Council […] shall be made by an affirmative vote". This, however, does not rule out decision-making by consensus since it is characteristic of this procedure that all members of the Security Council endorse a decision reached by consensus. 155 That decisions by the Security Council may be made by consensus is, in fact, confirmed by several presidential statements which expressly use the words "the Council decides" 156 or are entitled "Decision of the Security Council". 157 Moreover, in early practice "the consensus of the views of the Council members" was referred to by the President as "the Council's decision" and in the Official Records of the Security Council it was entered after the President's statement that, since he heard no objection, he declared the consensus adopted: "It was so decided." 158 The practice of States and the UN Secretariat also confirms that presidential statements are decisions of the Security Council in the sense of Article 27 of the UN Charter. 159 Thus, the delegate of Pakistan declared on 4 November 1994 in the Security Council: "The decision taken by the Security Council through the presidential statement read out at the 2448 th meeting of the Council represent another important link in the overall efforts to improve and rationalize the functioning of the Security Council […] ." 160 In its Progress Report on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, the Secretary-General wrote: "I am confident that it [the Security Council] will continue to exercise its authority and take all necessary steps to ensure full compliance with its decisions, including […] the presidential statement of 23 July 1997 (S/ PRST/1997/39) ." 161 Bangladesh wrote in the report on its presidency of the Security Council in March 2000 that the Working Group on Documentation and Procedure had examined "issues relating to the distribution of the text of [presidential] statements, communicating Council decisions and messages to all concerned". 162 In contrast, statements by the President of the Security Council to the press do not constitute decisions of the Security Council under Article 27 of the UN Charter. 163 This is already shown by the fact that, unlike presidential statements, they are not included in the publication entitled "Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council" published annually in the "S/INF/*" series as part of the Official Records of the Security Council. As has been shown above, 164 presidential press statements are not made "on behalf of the Security Council" but "on behalf of the members of the Council". Furthermore, the text of presidential press statements or at least its elements is adopted by Council members in informal consultations. Decisions of the Security Council, however, can only be taken in a formal meeting of the Security Council. It cannot be done in a private gathering of the Council members. 165 The taking of a decision in this way would give informal consultations an official legal status which they do not have. 166 This is also confirmed by the practice of the Security Council which distinguishes in its practice notes between "statements to the press made by the President on behalf of Council members or decisions of the Council." 167 Unlike presidential statements, press statements thus have no legal status at all.
V.B. The Legal Implications of Presidential Statements
The Security Council can, without question, take internal organizational and procedural decisions in presidential statements which bind the Council itself and its members as well as the Secretariat. 168 It may also authorize in a presidential statement the Secretary-General to take action incurring financial obligations (such as the enlargement of the number of military observers or the provision of additional material and means of transportation for a peacekeeping force 169 ) which the General Assembly has no alternative but to honor as expenses of the United Nations within the meaning of Article 17 of the UN Charter and which may be raised from obligatory contributions to be made by the member States. 170 The important question, however, is: Are presidential statements legally binding on the member States of the United Nations, i.e., are the member States obligated to adhere to them? The fact that presidential statements constitute "decisions of the Security Council" in the sense of Article 27 of the UN Charter does not allow any conclusion about their legal implications. The word "decision" is used in more than one meaning in the United Nations Charter. Even a recommendation may be a decision in that sense, although a non-binding one. According to Article 4, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations "will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." This recommendation is usually referred to as "decision". 171 Thus, the statement read out by the President of the Security Council on 18 May 1992 reads in part as follows:
It is a privilege for me, on behalf of the members of the Security Council to congratulate the Republic of Croatia on the decision which the Council has just taken, namely to recommend to the General Assembly the admission of the Republic of Croatia to membership in the United Nations. 172 167 See, e.g., UN Doc. S/2001 S/ /640, 29 June 2001 ; S/2002 S/ /603, 6 June 2002 . By "decisions of the Council" the Security Council means resolutions and presidential statements, see ibid., 18. 168 See Chapter V and Art. 98 of the UN Charter. 169 See above n. 131. 170 Cf. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), ICJ Reports 1962, 151 at 169, 175-177. 171 See also Art. 18, para. 2, of the UN Charter. 172 UN Doc. S/23945, 18 May 1992 (italics added) . See also S/ PRST/2002/23, 24 July It is clear that this recommendation of the Security Council cannot be a binding decision; otherwise, the UN Member States assembled in the General Assembly could no longer decide freely whether or not to admit a State to membership of the organization. Article 4, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter providing for a "decision of the General Assembly" would become an empty shell.
The decisive question thus is whether presidential statements qualify as (a means to convey) binding decisions of the Security Council in the sense of Article 25 of the UN Charter. Article 25 does not contain any provision on the form in which a binding decision is to be taken. The UN Charter and its Provisional Rules of Procedure provide the Security Council with considerable flexibility in choosing the form of a (binding) decision best suited to the situation. 173 A binding decision thus could, in principle, be contained in a presidential statement. It is generally accepted that decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are legally binding in terms of Article 25. In order to trigger decisions under Chapter VII it is necessary for the Security Council to "determine" under Article 39 that the situation in question constitutes a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression". As has been shown, 174 the presidential statements adopted to date have neither made reference to Chapter VII nor have they contained a formal determination pursuant to Article 39. A mere allusion by the Security Council to a threat to the peace is not sufficient in this respect. 175 It is therefore suggested that none of these presidential statements falls under Chapter VII. 176 It is already for this reason that most States and the majority of the literature would, it is suggested correctly, deny them any binding legal force. 177 This position, however, does not conform with the view taken by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In its Namibia Opinion, 178 the ICJ had to decide whether a resolution which was not preceded by a finding under Article 39 and thus clearly did not fall The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council. Unfortunately, this question was not taken up by the Court in its judgment of 27 February 1998. 183 According to the Court's argument in the Namibia Opinion one would have to determine in each case whether the Security Council intended a presidential statement to be binding, having regard to its terms, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining its legal consequences. 184 As no official records exist of informal consultations, the discussions leading to a presidential statement would, however, not be available to the Court of Justice. If one examines the language of presidential statements adopted since 1946, the presidential statement of 3 March 1993 is probably the closest one gets to a binding decision. In this statement the Council "having determined in the relevant resolutions that this situation constitute a threat to international peace and security […] insists that these steps [previously set out in the statement] must be taken immediately." 185 The demands contained in the presidential statement were, however, not addressed to a member State of the United Nations but to "the leaders of all the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina" or to the "Bosnian Serb side". Thus, it cannot be taken as an example of a binding decision in the sense of Article 25 of the UN Charter which only concerns the Members of the United Nations. In any case, it is argued that no examination of the language of a presidential statement is necessary as the circumstance that a decision is contained in a presidential statement instead of in a resolution already shows that the Security Council did not intend to make it binding for member States. 186 This does not, of course, mean that all resolutions are intended to be binding (which they are not), 187 it is only to say that if the Security Council intends to adopt a mandatory decision, it will, as a rule, opt for the form of a resolution. First, a presidential statement may be used to complement a resolution. 195 It may be issued either at the same time as the resolution (immediately before or after its adoption) or sometime later. In the first case, the presidential statement may either elaborate the resolution or serve as a trade-off for the agreement of Council members or as compensation for a response otherwise perceived to be inadequate by the parties by stating a position which the majority or a permanent member of the Security Council is not prepared to include in the resolution itself. The following may serve as an example: In the wake of the Temple Mount incident on 8 October 1990 when twenty Palestinians were killed and more than 150 injured when several Israelis symbolically laid the cornerstone for the second Temple near the Dome of the Rock Mosque, the Council adopted three resolutions which did not fully meet the expectations of the Palestinians and Arab countries. 196 In order to address their concerns, the Security Council in paragraph six of the preamble of resolution 681 (1990) of 20 December 1990 took into consideration a statement "concerning the method and approach for a comprehensive just and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict" which was read out by its President immediately prior to the adoption of the resolution during the 2970 th meeting of the Council. 197 In this statement the members of the Security Council agreed that "an international conference, at an appropriate time, properly structured, should facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict." 198 This was the first time that the Security Council expressly endorsed the idea of an international conference to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, an idea promoted by the Palestinians but rejected by Israel and the United States of America. As the latter had not, however, fully 193 S/22027, 20 December 1990. given up the objections to the idea, it could be included only in a complementary presidential statement and not in the resolution itself. 199 Presidential statements complementary to a Council resolution are comparable to agreements relating to a treaty made between all the parties either in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty or subsequently. In so far as the rules on treaty interpretation are, by analogy, applicable to the interpretation of Security Council resolutions, 200 presidential statements may be used as a means of interpretation in the sense of Article 31, paragraphs 2 (a) and 3 (a), of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties to establish the context of the resolution.
Secondly, the Security Council may employ presidential statements in order to implement a resolution. For example, the presidential statement of 2 November 1973 was entitled "United Nations Emergency Force (Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973): implementation-second phase". 201 After the Security Council had decided in resolution 340 (1973) to "set up immediately […] a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to that effect" and, in resolution 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, had decided that the Force shall be established in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 340 (1973) for an initial period of six months, it used the presidential statement of 2 November 1973 to announce the member States which were invited to contribute troops to the Force. 202 While both the establishment of the Force and the determination of the duration of its mandate required a binding decision and thus a resolution, the announcement of the composition of the Force, as an internal organizational question, could be made in a presidential statement.
Presidential statements may also be used to convey the result of a review process provided for in a resolution, 203 to reaffirm a resolution, 204 to remind States of their obligations to comply with the provisions of a resolution, 205 to document the non-compliance of a State with a resolution, 206 or to set out the conditions for the adoption of a resolution. 207 Finally, presidential statements may simply translate the inability of the Council to agree on the text of or the need for a resolution. The latter may be illustrated by the following example: On 10 November 1967 the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution in which the UN Secretary-General was authorized to "increase the number of observers [in the Suez-Canal zone] to ninety and to take measures proposed in his report [...] concerning the provision of additional technical facilities and means of transport for the United Nations Observer Group." 208 As Council members could not agree on the question whether the enlargement of the existing peacekeeping operation by the Secretary-General required a further authorization by the Security Council, the problem was "solved" on 8 December 1967 by adopting a presidential statement which largely resembled the Soviet draft resolution. 209 Presidential statements also play an important role in the political process. They serve as a means to diffuse tension and to take up the concerns of the parties if a permanent member objects to the adoption of a resolution in order to protect its interests or those of its allies or client States. For example, the United States on several occasions indicated that it would not accept a draft resolution on the situation in the Middle East or related items but expressed its readiness to work on a presidential statement on the matter. This may be one reason why presidential statements on the Arab-Israeli conflict 210 (with over 130 statements in total) still head the all time "league table" of presidential statements. Similarly, China has repeatedly indicated that a presidential statement is the only measure it will consent to with respect to the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). On 31 March 1994 the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that exerting pressure on Pyongyang "can only deteriorate the atmosphere and aggravate the problem. Therefore we do not accept a Security Council resolution." He added that China's insistence on a presidential statement "represents an effort to facilitate the resumption of dialogue." 211 Faced with Chinese opposition the Council did not adopt a resolution but, instead, several presidential statements which contained the warning that the "Security Council decides to remain actively seized of the matter and that further Security Council consideration will take place if necessary […] ." 212 The United States of America and the other permanent members which had initially favored a resolution in the end accepted a presidential statement in order to keep China on board, rather than see it abstain or veto the draft resolution which in both cases would have weakened the message that was to be conveyed to the DPRK. However, they tried to include as much of the draft resolution in the presidential statement as possible. It was hoped that China's cooperation in devising the presidential statement would lay the groundwork for its future abstention should the Council, in case of non-compliance with its requests, ultimately decide to impose sanctions on North Korea.
In addition, presidential statements allow the Security Council to use much stronger language than in a resolution. It seems that the permanent members are prepared to be more critical of their allies in a presidential statement than in a resolution. This may be illustrated by the following examples: After an attack by Palestinian armed elements in April 1980, Israeli armed forces moved into southern Lebanon. During the operation two Irish soldiers of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were killed by the South Lebanese Army (SLA) under Major Haddad which was supplied, trained and advised by Israel. In its presidential statement of 18 April 1980 "the Security Council strongly condemns all those who share in the responsibility for this outrageous act", i.e. "the attacks on the Force and the cold-blooded murder of peace-keeping soldiers by the de facto forces, [i.e. the SLA and Israel 213 ]." 214 In comparison, resolution 467 (1980) which was adopted six days later only "strongly deplores […] all acts of hostility against the Force" and "all acts that have lad to the loss of life and physical injuries among the personnel of the Force" without attributing responsibility. 215 Another interesting case study in this connection is the use of chemical weapons during the First Gulf War by Iraq, at that time an ally of the permanent Council member the United States of America. While the Security Council in the relevant resolutions, after noting that both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq are parties to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, only "deplores […] 212 S/ PRST/1994 /13, 31 March 1994 S/PRST/1994 /28, 30 May 1994 S/PRST/1994 /64, 4 November 1994 
VII. Concluding Remarks
A presidential statement is not just another United Nations document. Although not a legally binding decision in the sense of Article 25 of the UN Charter, it is not without legal implications. Its adoption by consensus ensures that it carries considerable political weight. It constitutes an essential element in the three-tier response system that may be applied to the bulk of disputes and situations dealt with by the Security Council: a presidential press statement as the quickest but also mildest form of reaction, followed by a presidential statement and finally a resolution. 218 While a press statement is made on behalf of the members of the Council, the latter two instruments constitute proper Security Council action. Presidential statements are thus an important weapon in the diplomatic arsenal of the Security Council. Although there seems to be a tendency in recent years to scale down the number of presidential statements and to make greater use of press statements by the President, 219 presidential statements have a distinctive and important legal and political role to play as it is only through them that the Council as an organ of the United Nations can express itself "below" the level of a resolution. In view of this role their existence as a distinct category of Security Council decision-making should be recognized and institutionalized in any future revision of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council. 
